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INTRODUCTION 
 Buoyed by decades of U.S. Supreme Court decisions elevating the Federal 
Arbitration Act (“FAA”)1 to “super-contract” status,2 the use of pre-dispute ar-
bitration agreements (“PDAAs”) in the United States has become ubiquitous. 
Historically, arbitration was a dispute resolution option negotiated by two or 
more parties to resolve purely private, contractual disputes.3 Today, mandatory 
arbitration has expanded to myriad sectors, including all manners of consumer 
and service disputes, investor disputes, employment and civil rights disputes. 
“From birth to death, the use of arbitration has crept into nearly every corner of 
Americans’ lives, encompassing moments like having a baby, going to school, 
getting a job, buying a car, building a house and placing a parent in a nursing 
home.”4 
 In these non-traditional contexts, PDAAs are not negotiated and knowing 
consent to arbitration rarely exists.5 While a customer’s signature on a multiple-
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1  9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2012) (originally enacted as the United States Arbitration Act of Feb. 
12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883). 
2  Jill I. Gross, The Historical Basis of Securities Arbitration as an Investor Protection 
Mechanism, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 171, 180 (2016). 
3  Imre Stephen Szalai, Exploring the Federal Arbitration Act Through the Lens of History, 
2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 115, 118 (2016). 
4  Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice 
System,’ N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2015, at A1 (this article was one of a front page, three-part se-
ries in The New York Times that focused on the ubiquity of mandatory arbitration clauses) 
See also Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Religious Arbitration, Scripture Is 
the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2015, at A1; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert 
Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2015, 
at A1. 
5  CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY, REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO 
DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a), at § 1.4.2 
(2015) (“CFPB Arbitration Study”). Most retail investors, for example, are unaware of man-
datory PDAAs in their customer agreements with their financial advisor, and are often 
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paged account agreement, or “click” on the “I Agree” tab at the end of a list of 
“Terms and Conditions” on an internet agreement, may legally constitute “con-
sent,”6 few consumers knowingly agree to waiving their right to judicial access 
and all the protections afforded by a judicial forum. Moreover, the increasing 
use of class-action waivers in consumer and employment agreements forces 
more disputes into arbitral forums, while effectively precluding claims that are 
too small to justify the litigation costs from ever being brought. 
 This trend requires us to reexamine whether the arbitral forum can (and 
should) evolve to accommodate a growing number of forced participants with 
claims involving non-traditional areas that implicate, at least in part, matters of 
public policy. In an article appearing in this issue, Professor Deborah Hensler 
and Damira Khatam, J.S.D., correctly observe that the expanding application of 
arbitration to encompass disputes that implicate matters of public policy have 
increasingly pushed private forums across domestic arbitration, international 
commercial arbitration, and investor-state arbitration procedure to incorporate 
certain due process protections and other procedures that resemble those found 
in judicial forums.7 They argue that this re-invention of arbitration undermines 
both the value of arbitration for purely private disputes (presumably among tru-
ly consenting participants to that process), as well as undermining courts and 
the value of judicial resolution of societal issues.8  
 Certainly in the context of domestic arbitration (with which I am most fa-
miliar), I could not agree more that we need to re-examine the scope of arbitra-
tion, particularly when widespread use of PDAAs and class-action waivers 
sweeps into arbitration millions of potential claims that implicate matters of 
public policy. Moreover, a historical examination of domestic arbitration and 
the purpose of the FAA reveal that current Supreme Court jurisprudence on 
                                                                                                                                 
shocked to learn that they must bring their claims in arbitration. See N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs 
Ass’n, Written Statement of the North American Securities Administrators Association 
(NASAA) on “Mandatory Binding Arbitration: Is it Fair and Voluntary?,” at 2, 
http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/NASAA-Arbitration-Statement-
9.15.09.pdf. [https://perma.cc/5K2E-832W] (Sept. 15, 2009) (“Many investors remain una-
ware of this industry arbitration provision, fail to appreciate its significance, or are powerless 
to negotiate a different approach to dispute resolution with their brokers.”). 
6  See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S 333, 336–39 (2011) (boilerplate 
language in telephone service contract); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 
215 (1985) (language in agreement opening brokerage account); Sgouros v. TransUnion 
Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1036 (7th Cir. 2016) (clicking “I accept” on website agreement can 
bind customer to arbitration provided that the button was near the service agreement or ac-
cess to the service agreement); Hancock v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 701 F.3d 1248, 1256–58 
(10th Cir. 2012) (clicking “I agree” to an agreement that user has the opportunity to read on 
the website constitutes consent). 
7  Deborah R. Hensler & Damira Khatam, Re-Inventing Arbitration: How Expanding the 
Scope of Arbitration Is Re-Shaping Its Form and Blurring the Line Between Private and 
Public Adjudication, 18 Nev. L. J. 381, 381 (2018). 
8  Id. 
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federal arbitration has strayed well beyond the FAA’s purpose and scope.9 Giv-
en the current composition of the Court, only legislation can realign domestic 
arbitration practice with its historical purpose. However, as discussed below, 
legislation has largely stalled and limited regulatory actions to protect consum-
ers face strong political headwinds.10 
 A concurrent approach is to continue pushing for evolution of the arbitral 
forum to accommodate the increasing number of forced participants with 
claims that implicate matters of public policy, including federal statutory 
claims. Perhaps the best example of such evolution is in the context of securi-
ties arbitration in the forum administered by the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (“FINRA”).11 Pushed by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) and investor advocates, FINRA has made significant changes to its ar-
bitration rules governing customer disputes to better serve investors. Although 
concerns remain about investor access, the lack of transparency, and investors’ 
perception of fairness, among other things, FINRA arbitration compares favor-
ably to arbitration of consumer claims.12  
  Similarly, incorporating due process and procedural reforms to increase 
access, fairness, and transparency in other arbitration forums provides in-
creased protections for individuals forced into a process that many feel is 
rigged against them.13 It may also provide a less-expensive alternative to litiga-
tion of smaller claims in some contexts, such as small-investor claims against 
their brokers.14 To the extent such reforms incorporate procedures common in 
judicial litigation, and added costs, businesses may re-think their use of manda-
tory PDAAs in the first place.  
                                                        
9  See Ronald G. Aronovsky, The Supreme Court and the Future of Arbitration: Towards a 
Preemptive Federal Arbitration Procedural Paradigm?, 42 SW. L. REV. 131, 174–75 (2012) 
(the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence “has created a robust, preemptive federal pro-
arbitration policy . . . largely untethered to the language of the FAA”). 
10  See infra notes 43–66 and accompanying discussion. 
11  FINRA is a private, not-for-profit corporation functioning as a self-regulatory organiza-
tion registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. FINRA was formed in July 
2007 by the consolidation of the National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) and 
the regulatory arm of the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”). FINRA is responsible for 
regulatory oversight of broker-dealers in the U.S. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 “Ex-
change Act” § 15(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8); see also Karsner v. Lothian, 532 F.3d 876, 
880 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“FINRA, as NASD’s successor, is ‘the only officially registered ‘na-
tional securities association’ under [the Exchange Act].’ ”) (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Deal-
ers, Inc. v. SEC, 431 F.3d 803, 804 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). All broker dealers must be registered 
with FINRA. Exchange Act § 15(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8); Fiero v. Fin. Indus. Regulato-
ry Auth., Inc., 660 F.3d 569, 571 (2d Cir. 2011). 
12  See infra notes 66–99 and accompanying discussion. 
13  Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Fairness Index: Using a Public Rating System to 
Skirt the Legal Logjam and Promote Fairer and More Effective Arbitration of Employment 
and Consumer Disputes, 60 KAN. L. REV. 985, 1028 (2012). 
14  Jill I. Gross, AT&T Mobility and the Future of Small Claims Arbitration, 42 SW. L. REV. 
47, 65 (2012). 
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I. THE EXPANDING SCOPE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION  
A. Widespread Use of PDAAs in Non-Traditional Contexts 
 Mandatory arbitration provisions have long been used to resolve purely 
private, contractual disputes between merchants and commercial businesses.15 
PDAAs allow businesses to manage litigation costs and risks by providing cer-
tainty of the forum and the rules applicable to the resolution of their disputes, 
privacy, a faster and less costly process, and finality of the decision, which is 
often made by an arbitration panel composed of industry experts.16 In response 
to initial judicial hostility to arbitration, Congress passed the FAA in 1925, 
which declared PDAAs valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. 17 
 The Supreme Court has held that the purpose of the FAA was to place arbi-
tration agreements on “the same footing as other contracts.”18 Notwithstanding 
this principle re-iterated by the Court in a long line of cases through AT&T Mo-
bility LLC v. Concepcion19 and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restau-
rants,20 Supreme Court jurisprudence in the last forty years has actually thwart-
ed that purpose, establishing, instead, a judicial policy favoring arbitration.21 
The Supreme Court has held that the FAA creates a federal substantive law of 
                                                        
15  Jeff Sovern et al., “Whimsy Little Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences: An Empiri-
cal Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1, 5–6 
(2015); see also Szalai, supra note 3, at 117,  
The history of the FAA’s enactment helps demonstrate that the FAA was originally intended to 
provide a framework for federal courts to support a limited, modest system of private dispute 
resolution for commercial disputes, not the expansive system that exists today involving both 
state and federal courts and covering virtually all types of non-criminal disputes. 
16  Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 371, 372, 390 (2016). 
17  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24–25 (1991). Section 2 of the 
FAA provides that:  
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transac-
tion, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit 
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall 
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract. 
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947). 
18  Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 96, 
68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924)); see also AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 
333, 339 (2011) (“In line with these principles, courts must place arbitration agreements on 
an equal footing with other contracts . . . and enforce them according to their terms”). 
19  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339. 
20  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013). 
21  See Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 94 (2012). See also Aronovsky, supra note 9 at 134 
(the Court’s expansive “ ‘pro-arbitration policy’ may be leading toward a preemptive federal 
arbitration procedural paradigm”). 
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arbitration applicable in both federal and state courts, which preempts conflict-
ing state law.22  
 Businesses’ use of PDAAs greatly expanded as the Supreme Court’s arbi-
tration jurisprudence elevated the FAA. The Supreme Court upheld mandatory 
arbitration of investor disputes with their brokers,23 consumer contracts,24 em-
ployment agreements,25 and nursing home admission applications,26 among 
others, providing the groundwork for enforcement of virtually every type of ar-
bitration agreement in any context.27 In contrast to PDAAs used in private, 
commercial contracts between businesses, PDAAs in consumer contracts or in 
other non-traditional contexts are not negotiated, and individuals subject to 
them rarely know that they exist or deprive them of their right to pursue judicial 
remedies.28  
 Businesses have further sought to limit litigation costs of class actions by 
including class-action waivers in their contracts.29 These provisions generally 
prohibit individuals from bringing a judicial class-action or other collective ac-
tion (such as in the arbitral forum itself) or both.30 As part of a mandatory 
PDAA, a class-action waiver requires an aggrieved party to bring his or her 
claim—regardless of its size—individually in arbitration.31 Rejecting arguments 
                                                        
22  Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10, 16 (1984). 
23  Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 222, 238 (1987). 
24  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352 (contract with telephone carrier services); CompuCredit 
Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 97, 104–05 (2012) (credit card agreements). 
25  Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001). See also Jean R. Sternlight, Dis-
arming Employees: How American Employers Are Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive 
Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1317–19 (2015) (noting that 20 per-
cent of non-unionized employees are covered by arbitration clauses, and that this number 
will grow as recent Supreme Court cases on class-action waivers will likely encourage more 
employers to use them). 
26  Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 533–34 (2012) (per curiam). Most 
recently the Supreme Court overturned a Kentucky Supreme Court decision which held that 
a power of attorney must expressly confer authority to waive the right to a jury trial in order 
be able to sign a PDAA; the Court held the Kentucky Supreme Court rule “single[d] out ar-
bitration agreements for disfavored treatment.” Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 
137 S. Ct. 1421, 1425 (2017). 
27  Michael J. Yelnosky, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia and the Continued Ascendance of Fed-
eral Common Law: Class-Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration Under the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 22 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 287, 287 (2017). 
28  Sovern et al., supra note 15 at 58–61 (in an empirical study of consumers’ awareness of 
the existence and effect of arbitration provisions in their consumer contracts, less than 9 per-
cent of consumers that reviewed a standard credit card agreement with a PDAA realized that 
the contract had both an arbitration provision and that it would prevent them from bringing a 
claim in court). 
29  Richard Frankel, “What We Lose in Sales, We Make Up in Volume”: The Faulty Logic of 
the Financial Services Industry’s Response to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s 
Proposed Rule Prohibiting Class Action Bans in Arbitration Clauses, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 
283, 285–86 (2016). 
30  Id. at 285. 
31  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351–52 (2011). 
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that such class-action waivers effectively deprive consumers with small claims 
from pursuing their rights, the Court held in Concepcion that the FAA compels 
enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms, and preempts 
contrary state law that classifies class-action waivers in consumer contracts as 
unconscionable.32  
 Any hopes that the “effective vindication” doctrine33 would serve to protect 
access to courts based on the size of the individual claim were dashed in Italian 
Colors where Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, dismissed the doctrine as 
mere dicta and rejected the notion that the costs of pursuing individualized 
claims in arbitration could invalidate a PDAA.34 Reasoning that the doctrine 
originated from a desire to protect the prospective assertion of rights,35 the 
Court made clear that the doctrine does not invalidate a mandatory PDAA due 
to costs associated with proving the claim.36 “[T]he fact that it is not worth the 
expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimina-
tion of the right to pursue that remedy.”37 Concepcion and Italian Colors are 
widely regarded as having dealt a fatal blow to judicial class actions brought on 
behalf of consumers, civil rights plaintiffs, and others.38  
                                                        
32  Id. at 338–39. 
33  The “effective vindication” doctrine was derived from language in Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., where the Supreme Court, in compelling arbitration 
of antitrust and unfair competition claims, stated that “so long as the prospective litigant ef-
fectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute [provid-
ing the cause of action] will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.” 473 
U.S. 614, 637 (1985). 
34  American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013). 
35  According to the majority, examples of such barriers to the potential assertion of statutory 
rights include an arbitration provision forbidding the assertion of certain rights of action in 
the first place, or an arbitral system that imposes “administrative fees” that are “so high as to 
make access to the forum impracticable.” Id. at 2310–11. 
36  Id. at 2311. 
37  Id. 
38  See generally Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness 
Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 462–
64 (2011) (“[T]he most pressing issue in consumer arbitration, in the wake of recent Su-
preme Court decisions, is the lack of a viable forum for consumers with low value claims.”); 
Miriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T 
Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012) (Concepcion all but forecloses 
aggregate litigation for consumers, civil rights plaintiffs, and others because companies can 
essentially insulate themselves with waiver provisions that will be upheld); Gross, supra 
note 14, at 49 (“By inserting a class action waiver clause in their consumer contracts, com-
panies can prevent consumers from aggregating small claims, forcing them to pursue small 
claims individually.”) (citations omitted); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC 
v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704 (2012) (“It is highly iron-
ic but no less distressing that a case with a name meaning ‘conception’ should come to signi-
fy death for the legal claims of many potential plaintiffs.”) (emphasis added). 
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B. Legislative Re-Alignment of Domestic Arbitration Stalled 
 Consumer and investor protection advocates have pushed for legislation to 
address the due process and public policy concerns raised by the widening 
scope of mandatory arbitration into these non-traditional areas. In 2017 alone, 
Democratic members of Congress have introduced (or re-introduced) no less 
than ten bills in the new Congress to limit or ban the use of PDAAs or class-
action waivers, or otherwise provide greater transparency and consumer protec-
tions in various contexts.39 The most expansive, the Arbitration Fairness Act, 
would amend the FAA to ban mandatory arbitration of consumer (defined to 
include investor), employment, antitrust, and civil rights disputes.40 A version 
of the Arbitration Fairness Act has been introduced in every Congress since 
2007.41  
 Other proposed legislation is more narrowly tailored to prohibit the use of 
PDAAs or class-action waivers in specific contexts. Four bills have been intro-
duced that do not amend the FAA, but rather, amend other federal statutes to 
address mandatory arbitration in agreements between investors and their bro-
kers or investment advisers,42 consumer bank and credit card agreements,43 stu-
dent enrollment agreements at colleges and universities,44 and employment 
agreements.45  
 Still other bills seek to address the lack of transparency in private arbitra-
tion and the implications of that process on matters of public policy. The Arbi-
                                                        
39  See Mandatory Arbitration Transparency Act of 2017, S. 647, 115th Cong. (2017); Arbi-
tration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. (2017); Safety Over Arbitration Act of 
2017, S. 542, 115th Cong. (2017); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, S. 537, 115th Cong. 
(2017); Arbitration Transparency Act of 2017, H.R. 832, 115th Cong. (2017); Court Legal 
Access and Student Support (CLASS) Act of 2017, S. 553, 115th Cong. (2017); Court Legal 
Access and Student Support (CLASS) Act of 2017, H.R. 2301, 115th Cong. (2017); Justice 
for Servicemembers Act of 2017, H.R. 2631, 115th Cong. (2017); Investor Choice Act of 
2017, H.R. 585, 115th Cong. (2017); Justice for Victims of Fraud Act of 2017, H.R. 1414, 
115th Cong. (2017). 
40  Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. (2017); Arbitration Fairness 
Act of 2017, S. 537, 115th Cong. (2017). 
41  Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbitration Fairness Act 
of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007). 
42  Investor Choice Act of 2017, H.R. 585, 115th Cong. §§ 3–4 (2017) (amends the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to prohibit mandatory 
PDAAs). 
43  Justice for Victims of Fraud Act of 2017, S. 552, 115th Cong. (2017) (amends the Truth 
in Lending Act and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act); Justice for Victims of Fraud Act of 
2017, H.R. 1414, 115th Cong. (2017). 
44  Court Legal Access and Student Support (CLASS) Act of 2017, S. 553, 115th Cong. 
(2017) (amends the Higher Education Act of 1965 to prohibit mandatory arbitration clauses). 
45  Protecting America’s Workers Act of 2017, H.R. 914, 115th Cong. (2017) (amends the 
Occupational and Safety Health Act of 1970 to prohibit the use of PDAAs in connection 
with employee whistleblower complaints); Justice for Servicemembers and Veterans Act of 
2017, S. 646, 115th Cong. (2017) (bans mandatory arbitration in employment rights of vet-
erans and service members). 
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tration Transparency Act of 2017, for example, would amend the FAA to pro-
vide for public arbitration hearings of consumer disputes involving consumer 
products or services.46 Other legislative proposals would amend the FAA to 
prohibit the enforcement of mandatory PDAAs in disputes that implicate mat-
ters of public health or safety,47 or in the context of an employment or consum-
er agreement that would prohibit whistleblower or other reporting of unlawful 
conduct.48 Finally, the Restoring Statutory Rights Act of 2017 would amend the 
FAA to restore its application to purely private, contractual disputes, by prohib-
iting PDAAs in cases involving the interpretation of a federal or state statute, or 
the U.S. Constitution, or a state’s constitution.49  
 Given Congress’s current composition, it is highly unlikely that any of the 
proposed legislation amending the FAA will pass. While legislation amending 
other federal statutes to provide carve outs for specific types of disputes could 
fare better because they focus on specific areas, they also face difficult odds. 
C. Regulatory (In)Action and Policy Shifts 
 Regulatory review of the use and impact of PDAAs and class-action waiv-
ers arguably provides a path to meaningful reform. Although limited in scope 
to the particular arena, agency rules are issued after months (or years) of study, 
a public notice-and-comment process, and other procedures under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (“APA”).50 As such, a rule promulgated under the APA—
including a rule limiting mandatory arbitration in a particular context—is usual-
ly substantiated with compelling public policy arguments and data in support of 
the rule, thereby providing a presumption of validity.51 Yet recent events have 
shown that regulatory reform is also at the mercy of political forces, as the 
Trump administration has swiftly moved to halt, revise, or overturn regulations 
in every arena, including those curbing mandatory arbitration. 
 Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”),52 Congress expressly authorized the newly-created 
Consumer Fraud Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) to conduct a study on the use of 
mandatory arbitration provisions in banking, credit card and other lending 
agreements, and to prohibit or limit the use of mandatory arbitration provi-
                                                        
46  Arbitration Transparency Act of 2017, H.R. 832, 115th Cong. (2017). 
47  Safety Over Arbitration Act of 2017, S. 542, 115th Cong. (2017). 
48  Mandatory Arbitration Transparency Act of 2017, S. 647, 115th Cong. (2017). 
49  Restoring Statutory Rights and Interests of the States Act of 2017, S. 550, 115th Cong. 
(2017); Restoring Statutory Rights and Interests of the States Act of 2017, H.R. 1396, 115th 
Cong. (2017). 
50  5 U.S.C. §§ 552–553 (2017). 
51  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“We 
have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive depart-
ment’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of 
deference to administrative interpretations.”). 
52  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, H.R. 
4173, 111th Cong. (2010). 
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sions.53 After years of study and public field hearings,54 on May 5, 2016 the 
CFPB released for public comment a proposed rule that would bar banks, lend-
ers, and other providers of certain financial products from using mandatory ar-
bitration provisions that include class-action waivers.55 The CFPB received 
over 110,000 comment letters on its proposal and, on July 19, 2017, published 
a final rule that bans the use of class-action waivers in consumer contracts with 
providers of banking, credit, and lending.56 The proposed rule also increases 
transparency by requiring companies that use arbitration to provide the CFPB 
with the pleadings and awards rendered in those proceedings.57 The new rule 
will not likely go into effect, however, because Congress exercised its authority 
to reverse the rule under the Congressional Review Act,58 and President Trump 
is expected to sign the legislation.59  
 Agency rules that have been issued are also at peril. For example, the De-
partment of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Ser-
vices (“CMS”) issued a final rule on October 4, 2016 titled, “Reform of Re-
quirements for Long-Term Care Facilities,” that would have barred nursing 
homes receiving federal Medicare or Medicaid funds from using PDAAs with 
                                                        
53  Id. § 1028 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (2010)). The Dodd-Frank Act also authorized the 
SEC to restrict the use of mandatory arbitration provisions. Id. § 921, 124 Stat. 1841 (2010) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(o)(2010)). However, the SEC has not yet acted on this authori-
ty. Pursuant to section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC conducted a study to evaluate 
the legal and regulatory standards for the protection of investors that, among other things, 
included a review of pre-dispute arbitration agreements. Although the staff conducted the 
study and discussed the growing use of PDAAs, it did not offer any recommendations for 
change. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-
DEALERS, at 80–82, 133–35 (2011). 
54  The CFPB launched its study in April 2012 and published its findings three years later in 
a 728-page report to Congress. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: 
REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a) (March 2015). 
55  Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32830 (proposed May 24, 2016) (to be codified at 
12 C.F.R. pt. 1040). 
56  Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210 (July 19, 2017) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 1040); see 
also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB ISSUES RULE TO BAN COMPANIES FROM USING 
ARBITRATION CLAUSES TO DENY GROUPS OF PEOPLE THEIR DAY IN COURT (July 10, 2017), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-issues-rule-ban-companies-
using-arbitration-clauses-deny-groups-people-their-day-court [https://perma.cc/4UN6-
VTMJ]. 
57  Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210 (Jul. 19, 2017) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 
pt. 1040). 
58  The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (1996), gives Congress the authori-
ty to pass a joint resolution to reverse an agency rule within sixty legislative days of its pub-
lication in the federal register. If both houses pass joint resolutions of disapproval and the 
President signs the resolution, the regulation is nullified, and provisions that had already 
been effective are retroactively negated. Moreover, a new rule in “substantially the same 
form” as the rejected rule may not be issued unless specifically authorized by Congress. 
59  Reuters, Republicans, Wall Street Score Victory in Dismantling Class-Action Rule, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2017/10/25/business/25reuters-usa-
consumers-arbitration.html [https://perma.cc/WMA7-ARCD]. 
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their residents or their representatives.60 Several nursing homes and the Ameri-
can Health Care Association challenged the new regulation prior to its taking 
effect in November 2016, seeking an injunction to prevent enforcement of the 
rule on the grounds that the CMS exceeded its authority and that the regulation 
violated the FAA.61 The district court granted an injunction and, on January 5, 
2017, the CMS appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit.62 However, the CMS withdrew its appeal before its brief was due in 
June 2017, and has since issued a proposed rule to remove the prohibition on 
PDAAs, which instead require enhanced notice provisions for residents and 
their families.63  
 Similarly, the Department of Education (“DOE”) published final regula-
tions in November 2016 that, among other things, prohibited the use of PDAAs 
and class-action waivers in college student loan agreements.64 In May 2017, the 
California Association of Private Postsecondary Schools filed a complaint chal-
lenging the regulations and seeking injunctive relief.65 Two weeks before the 
new DOE regulations were to take effect, the DOE published a new rule post-
poning the implementation of “certain provisions” of the final regulations—
including the provisions prohibiting PDAAs and class-action waivers—“until 
the judicial challenges to the final regulations [were] resolved.”66 Even if the 
DOE argues in favor of some parts of the 2016 final rules, however, it will like-
ly reverse course on (or not defend) the prohibition against PDAAs and class-
                                                        
60  Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Reform of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facili-
ties, 81 Fed. Reg. 68688, 68690 (Oct. 4, 2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 431, 
447, 482, 483, 485, 488, and 489). 
61  See Am. Health Care Ass’n. v. Burwell, 217 F. Supp. 3d 921, 925 (N.D. Miss. 2016). 
62  Notice of Appeal, Am. Health Care Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 16-00233 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 5, 
2017). 
63  Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Revision of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facili-
ties: Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 26649 (proposed June 8, 2017) (to be codified at 
42 C.F.R. pt. 483). The CMS reviewed the prior 2016 rule pursuant to the Trump administra-
tion’s January 30, 2017 Executive Order, “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory 
Costs.” Id. at 26650; see Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017). The pro-
posed rule would retain the requirements of the 2016 rule that nursing homes choosing to use 
PDAAs explain to residents their terms in plain language (in the language the resident or 
representative understands) and post notice of its use in its facilities. Id. at 26651. 
64  Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal Family 
Education Loan Program, William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, and Teacher Edu-
cation Assistance for College and Higher Education Grant Program, 81 Fed. Reg. 75926, 
76087–88 (Nov. 1, 2016) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 30, 668, 674, 682, 685 and 686). 
65  Complaint & Prayer for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2, Cal. Ass’n Private Postsec-
ondary Schs. v. DeVos, No. 17-CV-00999 (D.D.C. May 24, 2017). 
66  Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal Family 
Education Loan Program, William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, and Teacher Edu-
cation Assistance for College and Higher Education Grant Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 27621 
(June 16, 2017) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 668, 674, 682, and 685). 
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action waivers, following the pattern of the Trump administration’s across-the-
board reversals on this issue.67  
 Another example of a regulatory shift will likely come from the Depart-
ment of Labor (“DOL”), which in April 2016 passed a game-changing series of 
rules and exemptions to eliminate costly conflicts of interest in rendering re-
tirement investment advice.68 The new fiduciary rule (requiring that profession-
als provide retirement financial advice in the best interests of their clients) be-
came applicable on June 9, 2017. The application of the remaining regulations, 
which allows for mandatory arbitration, but bans class-action waivers, was de-
layed until January 1, 2018.69 The new DOL director appointed by President 
Trump has announced that it is considering changing or eliminating some or all 
                                                        
67  The notice postponing the implementation of the 2016 final rules laid the groundwork for 
reversal, as the DOE expressed concerns about the costs of implementing the rule in colleg-
es, and also noting that the plaintiffs in the underlying litigation “raised serious questions 
concerning the validity of certain provisions of the final regulations. . . .” Id. The DOE an-
nounced that it would continue its review and revisions to the 2016 regulations. Id. at 27622. 
68  See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment 
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20946–47 (Apr. 8, 2016). Financial professionals providing retirement 
investment advice to retail investors must put their clients’ best interests above their own 
financial interest, charge only reasonable compensation, and not make any material mislead-
ing statements. Id. at 20991. See also Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 
78 OHIO ST. L.J. 181, 225 n.275 (2017) (noting that in a changing political climate Congress 
may block or overturn DOL’s fiduciary rule) (citations omitted). 
69  The fiduciary rule and related regulatory exemptions became effective on April 10, 2016, 
but the DOL delayed implementation of the fiduciary rule and other regulations for twelve 
months, and remaining regulations for eighteen months. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; 
Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice; Best Interest Contract Exemption; 
Class Exemption for Principal Transactions in Certain Assets Between Investment Advice 
Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit Plans and IRAS; Prohibited Transaction Exemptions, 82 
Fed. Reg. 16902 (Apr. 7, 2017); Mark Schoeff Jr., OMB Approves Proposal for 18-month 
Delay of DOL Fiduciary Rule’s Second Phase, INV. NEWS (Aug. 29, 2017, 1:52 PM), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20170829/FREE/170829929/omb-approves-
proposal-for-18-month-delay-of-dol-fiduciary-rules [https://perma.cc/8B7X-XUFE]. How-
ever, on February 3, 2017, President Trump signed an Executive Memorandum directing the 
DOL to review the fiduciary rule, published in the federal register. Fiduciary Duty Rule—
Memorandum for the Secretary of Labor, 82 Fed. Reg. 9675 (Feb. 7, 2017). Thereafter, the 
DOL delayed application of the fiduciary rule until June 9, 2017, but further delayed some of 
the other rules until January 1, 2018. See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of In-
terest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice; Best Interest Contract Exemption; Class Ex-
emption for Principal Transactions in Certain Assets Between Investment Advice Fiduciaries 
and Employee Benefit Plans and IRAS; Prohibited Transaction Exemptions, 82 Fed. Reg. 
12319, 12325 (proposed Mar. 2, 2017) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510); 82 Fed. Reg., 
supra note 69, at 16902. On August 31, 2017 the DOL issued another proposed rule to fur-
ther delay implementation of the other parts of the rule an additional eighteen months, to Ju-
ly 1, 2019. Extension of Transition Period and Delay of Applicability Dates; Best Interest 
Contract Exemption (PTE 2016-01); Class Exemption for Principal Transactions in Certain 
Assets Between Investment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit Plans and IRAS (PTE 
2016-02); Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24 for Certain Transactions Involving In-
surance Agents and Brokers, Pension Consultants, Insurance Companies, and Investment 
Company Principal Underwriters (PTE 84-24), 82 Fed. Reg. 41365 (proposed Aug. 31, 
2017) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). 
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parts of the rule.70 It is unlikely that the DOL’s ban on the use of class-action 
waivers in agreements to provide retirement financial advice will survive. In-
deed, in defending the fiduciary rule and exemptions in pending litigation chal-
lenging the rules, the DOL stated that the department is changing its stance on 
the class-action waiver provision and would no longer defend it.71 
 Another abrupt reversal is in the context of three consolidated cases cur-
rently pending before the Supreme Court,72 challenging the National Labor Re-
lations Board’s (“NLRB”) position that class-action waivers in employment 
agreements violate Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act by precluding 
employees from engaging in “concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”73 The Court will resolve the con-
flict between the Seventh and Ninth Circuit, which have held that class-action 
waivers violate Section 7 of the NLRA,74 and the Fifth Circuit’s position that 
they do not.75 On June 16, 2017, the government took the nearly unprecedented 
                                                        
70  Citing the February 3, 2017 Presidential Memorandum ordering the DOL to conduct an 
additional examination of the costs of the fiduciary rule and related exemptions, the DOL 
announced that during the transition phase it would be issuing a request for information to 
solicit additional comments on whether changes to the marketplace and firm structures war-
rant additional postponement of the remaining requirements of the DOL rule, or further 
changes to the rule (and related exemptions) itself. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST FAQS (TRANSITION PERIOD), at 4 (May 2017). 
71  Carmen Germaine, DOL Drops Class Action Clause but Defends Fiduciary Rule, LAW360 
(July 5, 2017, 5:34 P.M.), https://www.law360.com/articles/941168/dol-drops-class-action-
clause-but-defends-fiduciary-rule [https://perma.cc/G5UA-7HAC]. In 2016, six separate 
lawsuits were filed by industry groups and associations against the DOL challenging various 
aspects of the new regulations, to include: Complaint at 2, Chamber of Commerce v. Perez, 
No. 16-CV-1476 (N.D. Tex. June 1, 2016) consolidated with Complaint at 2, American 
Council of Life Insurers v. Dep’t of Labor, No. 16-CV-1530 (N.D. Tex. June 8, 2016) and 
Complaint at 13, Indexed Annuity Leadership Council v. Perez, No. 16-CV-01537 (N.D. 
Tex. June 8, 2016); Complaint at 1–2, Nat’l Ass’n for Fixed Annuities v. Perez, No. 16-CV-
1035 (D.D.C. June 2, 2016), Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1–2, Market 
Synergy Group, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 16-CV-4083 (D. Kan. June 8, 2016), and 
Complaint at 1–2, Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans v. Perez, No. 16-CV-3289 (D. Minn. Sept. 29, 
2016). The district courts have rendered decisions in favor of the DOL and upheld the new 
regulations in all but the Thrivent Financial case, which is still pending. See Nat’l Ass’n for 
Fixed Annuities v. Perez, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6–7 (D.D.C. 2016); Chamber of Commerce v. 
Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152, 158–59 (N.D. Tex. 2017); and Mkt Synergy Grp, Inc. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23155, at *1–2 (D. Kan. 2017). 
72  Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. 
Ct. 809 (2017); Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 
S. Ct. 809 (2017); Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. grant-
ed, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017). 
73  D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB 184 (2012), rev’d in part, aff’d in part, D.R. Horton, Inc. v. 
N.L.R.B., 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) (reversing NLRB’s decision regarding class-
action waivers, but affirming on other grounds). 
74  Lewis, 823 F.3d at1151; Morris, 834 F.3d at 979. 
75  Murphy Oil, 808 F.3d at1015. 
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step of changing its position on this issue in its brief before the Supreme 
Court.76  
 These examples illustrate the potential for targeted reform of mandatory 
arbitration, supported by the experience of agency staff, studies, and a public 
notice-and-comment process. But, the recent rollbacks and actions by the 
Trump administration are a stark reminder of the limits of regulatory reform.  
II.  IMPROVING ACCESS AND FAIRNESS IN RESPONSE TO MANDATORY 
ARBITRATION: THE FINRA EXAMPLE 
 Given the current legal landscape, an alternative, pragmatic approach to 
dealing with the vast expansion of mandatory arbitration is to focus on the arbi-
tral forum itself. The leading example of this arbitral evolution is in the context 
of securities arbitration before FINRA, the self-regulatory organization respon-
sible for oversight over broker-dealers in the United States.77 Because it is un-
der direct regulatory oversight by the SEC, FINRA’s processes and rules, in-
cluding those governing securities arbitration, are subject to the SEC’s 
investor-protection mandate.78 This is a significant distinction from arbitral fo-
rums where consumer, employment, and other commercial matters are re-
solved.79  
 Arbitration of disputes among securities industry participants has a long 
history, dating back to the founding of the predecessor self-regulatory organiza-
                                                        
76  Julia Manchester, Justice Department Flips Position in Supreme Court Case, THE HILL 
(June 17, 2017, 3:31 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/338274-justice-
department-flips-from-obama-stance-to-oppose-nlrb-in-supreme [https://perma.cc/8FGM-6 
M88]. The Solicitor General also authorized the NLRB to act on its own behalf. NAT’L 
LABOR RELATIONS BD., STATEMENT OF THE NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD. CONCERNING THE 
SUPREME COURT CASE OF NLRB V. MURPHY OIL USA, INC. (June 16, 2017), 
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/statement-national-labor-relations-board-
concerning-supreme-court-case-nl-0 [https://perma.cc/5XXF-J8F2]. On August 9, 2017, the 
NLRB filed a brief in support of its prior position that such waivers violate Section 7 of the 
NLRA and are, therefore, unenforceable under the FAA’s savings clause. Brief for the Peti-
tioner at iii–iv, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 16-307 (Aug. 9, 
2017). 
77  The Exchange Act requires all broker-dealers that affect transactions in interstate com-
merce to register with the SEC. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(a)(1) (2012), 15 
U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (2012). It further requires all broker-dealers to become members of an 
SRO (Securities Exchange Act § 15(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8)), and to abide by its rules 
and be subject to the SRO’s regulatory processes and enforcement actions. Securities Ex-
change Act § 19(h)(1) (2012), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(1) (2012). FINRA operates the largest fo-
rum for the resolution of securities disputes in the U.S. See Arbitration & Mediation, FIN. 
INDUS. REG. AUTH., http://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation [https://perma.cc/79SF-
ZVLV] (last visited Dec. 18, 2017). FINRA Dispute Resolution provides an arbitration fo-
rum for customer disputes and industry disputes, such as those between broker dealers and 
associated persons, or between two or more broker dealers. 
78  15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (2016). 
79  Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Investor Protection Meets the Federal Arbitration Act, 1 
STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 1, 5–6 (2012). 
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tions of the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and NASD.80 Customer 
claims were regularly arbitrated until the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilko v. 
Swan,81 where the Court held that claims under the Securities Act of 1933 were 
not subject to mandatory arbitration.82 For nearly thirty-five years, investors 
had a choice to bring their claims against brokers in either arbitration or go to 
court.83 The Court reversed course in Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 
where the Supreme Court held that securities disputes arising under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 were arbitrable,84 and two years later expressly over-
ruled Wilco v. Swan.85 Today, the use of arbitration to resolve securities dis-
putes among customers and members is nearly universal.86  
 When the Court considered McMahon in 1987, the SEC filed an amicus 
brief in support of arbitration of securities disputes, explaining that its newly 
granted authority over SROs under Congress’s 1975 amendments to Section 19 
of the Exchange Act87 could ensure the fairness and adequacy of SROs’ arbitra-
tion procedures and enforce customers’ rights under the Exchange Act.88 The 
SEC also helped develop a uniform code of arbitration procedure, which was 
voluntarily adopted by SROs.89 The SEC has since pushed SROs to develop a 
litigation model of arbitration consistent with procedural due process and de-
signed to improve investors’ perception of fairness.90  
                                                        
80  See generally, Gross, supra note 2, at 174–76. Professor Gross explains that the consider-
ations that drove the securities industry to prefer arbitration as a form of dispute resolution 
were to ensure that industry norms, rules, and practices would be enforced, ensure the good 
conduct of its members (which served to protect customers), and to provide a predictable and 
expedient resolution of disputes arising in a fast-moving market. Id. at 176–77. 
81  Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
82  Id. at 438. 
83  Many courts also exercised supplemental jurisdiction over investors’ state law claims. 
However, in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985), the Supreme Court 
held that the FAA required courts to compel arbitration of state law claims, even if it resulted 
in the inefficiency of bifurcated claims. Id. at 219–20. 
84  Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987). 
85  Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989). 
86  After McMahon, the vast majority of broker-dealers in the country inserted PDAAs in 
their agreements with customers, requiring them to arbitrate any claims arising out of their 
brokerage relationship. See Barbara Black, Can Behavioral Economics Inform Our Under-
standing of Securities Arbitration?, 12 TENN. J. BUS. L. 107 (2011). 
87  15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (2016) (SEC can only approve SRO rules that, among other 
things, are “designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices . . . and, in 
general, to protect investors and the public interest . . .”). 
88  Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 6–7, Shearson/Am. Ex-
press, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (No. 86-44), 1986 WL 727882 *6–7. 
89  Constantine N. Katsoris, Securities Arbitration After McMahon, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
361, 363–64, 369 (1987). 
90  Teresa J. Verges, Opening the Floodgates of Small Customer Claims in FINRA Arbitra-
tion: FINRA v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 623, 630–31 
(2014); Barbara Black, Is Securities Arbitration Fair to Investors?, 25 PACE L. REV. 1, 5–6 
(2004). 
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 As early as 1989, the SEC approved amendments to SRO rules (now em-
bodied in FINRA Rule 2268)91 requiring that specific language and disclosures 
be included in customer agreements that contain a PDAA,92 and further prohib-
iting SRO members from inserting “any condition” in a PDAA that limits or 
contradicts the arbitration rules of any SRO.93 FINRA has effectively used Rule 
2268(d) to prohibit member firms from inserting class-action waivers in cus-
tomer agreements94 and, most recently, to address the recent trend of firms us-
ing forum selection clauses to change the hearing location or require arbitration 
in another forum.95 
 Between 1997 and 2007, the SEC approved nearly all of the rule proposals 
filed by the NASD as a result of a comprehensive review undertaken by the 
Arbitration Policy Task Force, which was appointed by the NASD’s Board of 
Governors.96 The resulting 1996 Ruder Report contained over seventy recom-
                                                        
91  See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by NYSE, NASD, and American Stock Ex-
change Relating to the Arbitration Process and the Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses, 54 
Fed. Reg. 21144 (May 10, 1989). NASD members were informed in an August 1989 Notice 
to Members (“NTM”) that the amendments included an express prohibition on the use of 
language that “limits” or “contradicts” an SRO’s arbitration rules. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Deal-
ers, Inc., NTM Number 89-58 (Aug. 1989). 
92  FINRA Rule 2268(a) requires that any PDAA be highlighted and be preceded by lan-
guage expressly set out in the rule that alerts customers to the fact that the agreement con-
tains a PDAA and the consequences of entering into an arbitration agreement. FINRA Rule 
2268(a) (2011). 
93  Id. at 2268(d)(1). 
94  Although the rule does not expressly address judicial class actions, it prohibits members 
from including in their PDAAs “any condition that . . . limits the ability of a party to file any 
claim in court permitted to be filed in court under the rules of the forums in which a claim 
may be filed under the agreement.” Id. at 2268(d)(3). FINRA’s Board of Governors has 
made clear that when Rule 2268(d)(3) is read together with FINRA Rule 12204(d)—which 
proscribes class actions in arbitration—judicial class actions are permitted and any provision 
to limit a customer’s ability to bring or participate in a class action would be invalid. See De-
cision at 3, Dep’t of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab, Compl. No. 2011029760201 (Apr. 24, 
2014); see also Verges, supra note 90, at 635. 
95  See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 16-25, FORUM SELECTION PROVISIONS 
INVOLVING CUSTOMERS, ASSOCIATED PERSONS AND MEMBER FIRMS at 5 (July 2016), where 
FINRA recently reminded its members that Rule 12200 under the Customer Code preserves 
a customer’s right to demand arbitration, regardless of whether the firm has a PDAA with its 
customer, and that the firm is prohibited by Rule 2268 from including any provision in its 
customer agreement that abrogates that right. 
96  NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, INC., SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM: REPORT OF THE 
ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE at 1 (Jan. 1996). The resulting 1996 Report of the Arbitra-
tion Task Force, known as the “Ruder Report” (named after head of the task force, former 
SEC Chairman Robert S. Ruder), proposed a number of reforms of the arbitration process. 
Although the Ruder Report did not propose a “radical overhaul” of the arbitration process, it 
did propose significant reforms and “greatly influenced the future direction of securities arbi-
tration.” JERRY W. MARKHAM & RIGERS GJYSHI, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SECURITIES 
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 425 (2014). 
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mendations to “revamp securities industry arbitration,” most of which have 
been implemented in some form.97  
 The SEC has since approved new FINRA rules or amendments designed to 
improve investors’ access to the forum, provide certain due process protections, 
level the playing field, and increase transparency.98 FINRA has amended the 
definition of “public arbitrator” to eliminate individuals with ties to the securi-
ties industry from the public arbitration pool,99 and provide customers with the 
option of an “all public” arbitration panel.100 FINRA’s rules assure that custom-
ers can proceed at a geographic hearing location that is convenient for them.101 
FINRA has also amended its procedural rules to significantly limit the grounds 
upon which motions to dismiss may be granted prior to a hearing, thereby as-
suring that most customer claims be reviewed on the merits.102 It has also sim-
plified the discovery process through a presumptive automatic exchange of 
                                                        
97  NASD Dispute Resolution, The Arbitration Policy Task Force Report–A Report Card 1, 5 
(July 27, 2007). 
98  Verges, supra note 90, at 635; Black, supra note 90, at 5–6. 
99  FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 08-22, DEFINITION OF PUBLIC ARBITRATOR, 
SEC APPROVES RULE CHANGE TO AMEND THE DEFINITION OF PUBLIC ARBITRATOR IN THE 
ARBITRATION CODES FOR CUSTOMER AND INDUSTRY DISPUTES 3 (2008), 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p038472.p
df [https://perma.cc/J5XR-5R6D] (announcing amendments to the definition of public arbi-
trator in the Customer Code (Rule 12100(u))) and corresponding Industry Code (Rule 
13100(u)); see also FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 13-21, PUBLIC 
ARBITRATOR DEFINITION, SEC APPROVES AMENDMENTS TO ARBITRATION CODES TO REVISE 
THE DEFINITION OF PUBLIC ARBITRATOR (2013), http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/ 
@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p272613.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5RH-HL3M] 
(amending FINRA Rules 12100(u) (Customer Code) and 13100(u) (Industry Code) to ex-
clude persons associated with a mutual fund or hedge fund from serving as a public arbitra-
tor). 
100  FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 11-05, ARBITRATION PANEL COMPOSITION, 
CUSTOMER OPTION TO CHOOSE AN ALL PUBLIC ARBITRATION PANEL IN ALL CASES 3–4 
(2011), 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p122879.p
df [https://perma.cc/PFD5-KBZU] (announcing new Rule 12402 and Rule 12403 (consoli-
dating former FINRA rules on arbitrator panel composition and selection) that provide cus-
tomers with the option of selecting an “all public” panel in cases requiring three-arbitrator 
panels (claims over $100,000)). 
101  FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 10-17, HEARING LOCATIONS, 
AMENDMENTS TO THE ARBITRATION RULES ON HEARING LOCATIONS 2 (2010), 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p121222.p
df [https://perma.cc/PM6X-U9S9] (amending FINRA Rule 12213 (Customer Code) to pro-
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documents on customer and industry lists of documents set forth in FINRA’s 
Discovery Guide.103 FINRA has also attempted to answer calls for more trans-
parency by requiring arbitration panels to provide “explained decisions” upon 
the parties’ request.104  
 Additionally, FINRA has reduced cost and improved access for investors 
with smaller claims. FINRA has a simplified arbitration process that allows for 
the case to proceed entirely on the pleadings and other papers submitted by the 
parties, and provides a hearing option solely at the request of the customer. 105 
FINRA recently increased the monetary limits for simplified arbitration pro-
ceedings from $25,000 to $50,000.106 For claims between $50,000 and 
$100,000, FINRA provides for single-arbitrator panels, which significantly re-
duces the cost of an arbitration hearing.107 Finally, in the wake of its most re-
cent review of its arbitration forum,108 FINRA has announced it intends to file 
an amendment to its simplified process to provide investors with a third op-
tion—a telephonic hearing—in order to address investors’ dissatisfaction with 
“paper cases.”109  
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FINRA Rule 12401 (Customer Code) and Rule 13401 (Industry Code)). FINRA explained 
that the amendments would “streamline the dispute resolution process and decrease costs for 
users of the forum.” Id. at 2. 
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 These changes over the last three decades have transformed the securities 
arbitration forum such that it compares favorably, if not significantly better, to 
arbitration forums for the resolution of consumer or other disputes.110 Of 
course, concerns remain about the securities arbitration process, including the 
lack of transparency,111 arbitrator bias in favor of brokerage firms (who are re-
peat users of the forum),112 the increasing cost of arbitration (particularly with 
larger cases),113 and loss of judicial rulings on claims involving federal securi-
ties laws, regulations, and FINRA conduct rules.114 Yet, as the securities arbi-
tration model has shown, pushing for reform to level the playing field for 
forced participants is a critical component of investor protection.115  
 Consumer and employee advocates should similarly push for changes to 
arbitration in the context of consumer, employment, and other non-traditional 
disputes. Given the expanding use of PDAAs, many with class-action waivers 
that are increasingly supported by Supreme Court jurisprudence, it is essential 
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1186–89 (2010). Professor Gross further argues that the securities arbitration forum is not 
only fair to investors, but it also provides “a more hospitable forum than the court for the 
resolution of their disputes.” Jill I. Gross, The Customer’s Nonwaivable Right to Choose Ar-
bitration in the Securities Industry, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 383, 398, 402–03 
(2016) (tracing the history of securities arbitration and the customer’s right to demand arbi-
tration as a matter of investor protection and assurance of a dispute resolution forum for 
small claims). 
111  See Benjamin P. Edwards, The Dark Side of Self-Regulation, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 573, 
616–17 (explaining the need for increased transparency because “outside actors often strug-
gle to bring pressure to bear on self-regulatory organizations because they cannot obtain in-
formation.”); Benjamin P. Edwards, Arbitration’s Dark Shadow, 18 Nev. L.J. 427, 431 
(2018). 
112  NASAA, supra note 5, at 2 (citing a recent empirical study confirming that individual 
investors have “negative views of arbitration” and believe “the system is biased against 
them”); see also Jill Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empiri-
cal Study of Investors’ Views of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 
349, 385 (2008) (in a 2008 survey of customers that had completed an arbitration, authors 
observed that a significant number of those surveyed believed the system was biased against 
them). These perceptions are not without empirical support. See Stephen J. Choi, et al., The 
Influence of Arbitrator Background and Representation on Arbitration Outcomes, 9 VA. L. 
& BUS. REV. 43, 85 (2014) (empirical data supports arguments that panels with industry arbi-
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to make reforms to increase access, lower costs, and provide some due process 
protections for those claims.  
CONCLUSION 
 The widespread use of mandatory arbitration provisions and class-action 
waivers have required domestic arbitral forums to evolve and incorporate due 
process protections and procedures to increase access, level the playing field, 
and provide transparency. Unless and until the misalignment of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence and the FAA is corrected through legislative action, there is little 
choice but to provide better protections for forced participants of the process, 
even if those protections may fall short of alleviating concerns about access, 
process, and fairness.  
 Businesses that use PDAAs should also encourage reforms in other arbitral 
forums, even if they come at the expense of some of the benefits of arbitration 
in the first place. Fundamental notions of fairness and access to justice require 
greater transparency and some of the procedural protections found in judicial 
proceedings, particularly when the disputes implicate, at least in part, matters of 
public policy. Political winds change course; an evolution to better access, fair-
ness, transparency, and due process for forced users of arbitration in non-
traditional claims may be the best defense to preserve it. 
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